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I. INTRODUCTION
It was the middle of a summer day in 2008, in the middle of the week,
when Hurricane Dolly crept in from the Gulf of Mexico and slammed
into the South Texas Coast.1  Before she eventually passed, Dolly would
peel the laminated roof from the top of Rosa Elia Villarreal’s house and
toss it down in the middle of her front yard.2
Ms. Villarreal lives in Edinburg, Texas, and supports a household of six
on just $15,200 a year.3  She does not have homeowner’s insurance.4
Without a roof, rainwater leaked into her home, causing damage and
prompting the spread of mold.5  Her grandchildren were taken to the
emergency room for mold-related allergies on several occasions.6  Be-
cause Ms. Villarreal could not afford the estimated $10,000 in repairs,7
she applied for housing-repair assistance with the Federal Emergency
1. Demian McLean, Dolly Makes Landfall in Texas; Downgraded to Storm, BLOOM-
BERG, (July 23, 2008, 11:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=a3OUUBR.33EY (reporting details of Hurricane Dolly, which made landfall near the
Texas-Mexico border at 1 p.m. on Wednesday, July 23, 2008).  The storm was classified as a
Category Two hurricane when it hit land with wind speeds of about 100 miles per hour. Id.
On the first day after it hit, more than 61,000 people were without power, thousands more
were in shelters, and as much as twenty inches of rain was expected in some areas. Id.
Dolly was the first hurricane to cross the Gulf of Mexico in 2008, and the first to make a
direct hit on the Rio Grande Valley since Hurricane Bret in 1999. Id.
2. Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 24, La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Fed. Emer-





7. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 2.
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Management Agency (FEMA) under a statute that allows people in her
position to qualify for aid.8  FEMA is charged with distributing assistance
in coordination with its mission to “support our citizens” following disas-
ters.9  The federal government designated Hurricane Dolly as Disaster
No. 1780.10
In seeking assistance from FEMA, Ms. Villarreal encountered the same
situation as numerous homeowners following hurricanes Dolly and Ike in
2008: they were denied assistance by FEMA with only the explanation of
“insufficient damage,” and no one as able to tell “them what legal stan-
dard was applied or what facts were relied upon to deny them assis-
tance.”11  Internally, FEMA created a term to attempt to explain why it
denied applications by many low-income families, labeling the applica-
tions as denied for “deferred maintenance,” but it has neither defined the
term nor publicly explained how it applies the term to denials.12  Some
evidence suggests FEMA denied storm-related claims to homeowners
whose homes were not maintained, thereby discriminating against low-
income people who simply cannot afford expensive home repairs.13
Federal law prohibits discrimination against low-income people after a
disaster.14  Between 10,000 and 15,000 low-income homeowners—or half
8. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 5174(2)(A) (2006) (detailing presidential declaration powers
after a disaster).  The statute allows the President to:
[P]rovide financial assistance for—(i) the repair of owner-occupied private residences,
utilities, and residential infrastructure (such as a private access route) damaged by a
major disaster to a safe and sanitary living or functioning condition; and (ii) eligible
hazard mitigation measures that reduce the likelihood of future damage to such resi-
dences, utilities, or infrastructure.
Id.
9. About FEMA, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/about/in-
dex.shtm (last updated June 21, 2010) (explaining the purpose of FEMA and its statutory
authority).  FEMA states that its mission is “to support our citizens and first responders to
ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to
prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.” Id.
10. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 2, at 5.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 5 (alleging the vagueness of “deferred maintenance”).  The complaint states
that “publicly available legal standards do not mention ‘deferred maintenance’ or explain
how FEMA ascertains this information or uses it in its housing repair assistance decisions.”
Id.
13. Id. at 29. (explaining the economic discrimination argument).  The complaint al-
leges that “FEMA violates 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) by implementing an unpublished and unas-
certainable ‘deferred maintenance’ policy that effectively disqualifies low-income families
from housing repair assistance, promoting rather than preventing economic discrimina-
tion.” Id.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2006) (providing that federal relief after a disaster “shall
be accomplished in an equitable and impartial manner, without discrimination on the
grounds of . . . economic status”).
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of all Hurricane Dolly applicants—were denied claims based on FEMA’s
vague criteria of “insufficient damage” and “deferred maintenance.”15
The homeowners alleged the vague “deferred maintenance” rule “institu-
tionalizes economic discrimination.”16  A low-income housing official
said FEMA had not solved the problem despite pleas from many experts
in the housing field: “This tragedy will be repeated again unless FEMA
stops its ad hoc policy of denying home repairs to help poor families with
disaster damage,” said John Henneberger, co-director of the Texas Low
Income Housing Information Service.17  Ms. Villarreal and others sued
FEMA and prevailed in district court, but the Fifth Circuit refused to
compel FEMA to publish specific standards.18  The homeowners ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, which denied the petition for writ of certio-
rari in November 2010.19
This Comment urges FEMA to publish clear definitions of “insufficient
damage” and “deferred maintenance” so that homeowners might better
understand the criteria used in assessing their claims, and so FEMA em-
ployees are not given either real or apparent authority to arbitrarily deny
claims.  More broadly, this Comment demonstrates that the vague FEMA
policy is merely a symptom of a larger problem.  A problem in which a
variety of government agencies charged with helping disaster victims
practice—at times unintentionally—inherently discriminatory practices
against low-income people.  The nation saw evidence of this up-close fol-
lowing Hurricane Katrina in 2005, as well as in the wake of numerous
tornadoes, earthquakes, and hurricanes before and since.20  This Com-
15. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 2, at 5.
16. La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. B-08-487,
2009 WL 1346030, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2009) (citation omitted), vacated, 608 F.3d 217
(5th Cir. 2010), cert denied, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 525 (2010).
17. John Henneberger, Current FEMA Disaster Recovery Policy Will Leave Low-In-
come Hurricane Survivors Unassisted, TEXAS HOUSERS (July 1, 2010), http://texashousers.
net/2010/07/01/current-fema-disaster-recovery-policy-will-leave-low-income-hurricane-sur-
vivors-unassisted/.  Henneberger estimates that, as a result of FEMA’s deferred mainte-
nance policy, 115,000 “elderly, disabled, and low-wage homeowners” were left to fend for
themselves in damaged homes, without government aid after Hurricanes Ike and Dolly.
Id.  The Federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 compelled the executive branch to create
specific guidelines for determining aid eligibility, and Congress gave FEMA until 2002 to
create the guidelines. Id. However, FEMA still had not complied as of July 2010. Id.
18. La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 608 F.3d 217, 225
(5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 525 (2010).
19. La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 562 U.S. __, 131
S.Ct. 535 (2010) (denying petition for writ of certiorari from the Fifth Circuit).
20. See Declared Disasters by Year or State, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http:/
www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema (last modified July 3, 2011, 3:52PM) (list-
ing federal disaster declarations since 1953).  On average, FEMA has issued fifty-eight
disaster declarations per year since 1998. Id.
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ment further urges Congress to recognize housing as a human right and
to pass laws that ensure low-income Americans will not be the target of
discrimination following natural disasters.
Part II of this Comment addresses the vagueness problem in the
FEMA policy by analyzing case law relating to other vague governmental
policies and how courts have responded.  Part III of this Comment dem-
onstrates that federal agencies have historically acted in ways that dispro-
portionately affect low-income victims of natural disasters and shows that
such discrimination by federal agencies happens despite express direction
from Congress to help, not hurt, low-income Americans stricken by disas-
ters of all kinds.  Finally, Part IV of this Comment proposes solutions for
making FEMA’s policies non-discriminatory and for diminishing govern-
ment discrimination of all kinds against low-income victims of natural
disasters.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. A Vague FEMA Policy Shortchanged Thousands of Hurricane
Dolly Victims
When victims of a natural disaster apply for financial aid with FEMA,
the agency provides them with an informational handout that explains the
process of applying, the intended purpose of the aid, and the require-
ments for eligibility.21  Additionally, it provides general information for
those who lose their homes and are looking for help.22  This is the same
handout presumably available to the more than 10,000 Texans who ap-
plied for housing aid after Hurricane Dolly and were rejected under the
21. Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
http://www.fema.gov/assistance/process/assistance.shtm#0 (last modified Aug. 11, 2010,
2:03PM) (providing information on how to obtain housing, non-housing, and other services
in the wake of a disaster).  Some disaster victims are eligible for money to pay for medical
bills, funeral costs, clothing, cleaning supplies, cars, and moving expenses, all of which must
be directly related to the disaster. Id.  As with the housing aid, the non-housing aid is
available only for expenses that are either not covered or only partially covered by insur-
ance. Do I Qualify for Housing Needs Assistance?, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
http://www.fema.gov/assistance/process/qualify_other_housing.shtm (last modified Aug. 11,
2010, 2:03PM).
22. Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, supra note 21 (specifying what types of
housing aid are available through FEMA).  The agency helps disaster victims secure tem-
porary housing, repair their home, replace their home, or construct an entirely new home.
Id.  In giving aid, the agency strives to make the home “safe, sanitary, and functional.” Id.
Victims who receive the assistance can use it to repair, among other things, foundation,
sewage systems, heating and air conditioning, electrical systems, floors, ceilings, and cabi-
nets. What Specific Items are Covered by “Housing Needs” Assistance?, FED. EMERGENCY
MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/assistance/process/housingneeds.shtm (last modified
Aug. 11, 2010, 2:03PM).
224 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:219
“insufficient damage” or “deferred maintenance” premise.23  It is prob-
lematic, however, that nowhere in the handout or in FEMA’s other litera-
ture does the agency define “insufficient damage” even though thousands
of disaster victims received rejection letters listing the term as the only
reason for the government’s decision to deny aid.24  Internally, FEMA
assesses applications using a “deferred maintenance” designation, which
disfavors applicants who have not properly maintained their homes
before a disaster.25  The result is discrimination against low-income peo-
ple following natural disasters.
On one hand, FEMA’s use of the “insufficient damage” rationale to
deny aid is troubling because it is not clearly defined in FEMA literature
or rules, thereby making arbitrary application possible.  On the other
23. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 2, at 5 (outlining the extent to which
applicants were denied aid following Hurricane Dolly).  FEMA admitted that it denied aid
to an unusually high number of people in the aftermath of Hurricane Dolly, 10,000 of
which were denied for “deferred maintenance.” Id.  A FEMA spokesman said the high
rate of denials was attributable to “[a] lot of the homes . . . [having been] built from sec-
ond-hand materials.  So the damage was, in most cases, caused from the faulty building of
the house, and not the storm.” Id.
24. La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. B08487, 2009
WL 1346030, at *7 (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2009) (granting a preliminary injunction to plaintiffs
who sought to compel FEMA to publicly disclose its criteria for evaluating housing-repair
applications), vacated, 608 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 2010), cert denied, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 525
(2010).  The denial letter from FEMA to homeowners acknowledges that the family is
enduring hard times since the disaster, and it informs the homeowners of their right to
appeal the decision to FEMA.  Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 2, at 6–7.  The
letter describes “insufficient damage” in this way: “Based on your FEMA inspection, we
have determined that the disaster has not caused your house to be unsafe to live in.  This
determination was based solely on the damage to your home that are related to this disas-
ter.” Id. at 7.  FEMA refused to explain to plaintiffs’ counsel the precise standards it uses
in evaluating applications. Id. at 5.
25. La Union Del Pueblo Entero, 2009 WL 1346030, at *9.
FEMA’s deferred maintenance policy uses a standard derived from federal law, which
requires that to be eligible for assistance the damage incurred must have been caused
by the disaster and not the poor construction or poor maintenance of the home.
Id. The court held that FEMA must make public “ascertainable eligibility standards and
criteria,” but not directly condemning the FEMA “deferred maintenance” policy. Id.
Plaintiffs in the case allege a variety of injuries stemming from what they allege were deni-
als based on “deferred maintenance.” Id.  Several plaintiffs allege that Hurricane Dolly
damaged their roofs, allowing water to seep into the home and causing or exacerbating
asthma or other respiratory problems. Id.  The Fifth Circuit later held the district court
abused its discretion in granting the injunctive order because plaintiffs could not show a
substantial likelihood they could win on the merits and remanded the case.  La Union Del
Pueblo Entero v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 608 F.3d 217, 225 (5th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 525 (2010).  In March 2011, the district court denied the
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered the parties to file a discovery plan.
La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. B08487, 2011 WL
1230099, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2011).
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hand, Congress has given FEMA some measure of discretion in the appli-
cation of statutes by allowing FEMA to determine its own rules26 and
allowing FEMA to handle relief efforts “as may be necessary and
proper.”27  Therefore, any analysis of the vague nature of “insufficient
damage” must include an analysis not only of the courts’ doctrines deal-
ing with vague rules and statutes, but also of the statutory language from
which FEMA draws its enforcement power.
The legal framework described above presents clashing principles.  The
two principles are: first, the administrative doctrine granting deference to
agencies in interpreting and applying statutes to which their work relates;
and second, the federal courts’ general aversion to unnecessarily vague
policies.  Furthermore, the “ordinary meaning” doctrine bolsters home-
owners’ arguments and casts doubt on the legality of FEMA denials.28
Under “ordinary meaning,” an agency must apply the ordinary meaning
of a term unless it is specifically defined in the statute;29 here, the term
“insufficient damage” is not specifically defined.  The ordinary meaning
of language is left to interpretation.  However, it could be argued that
“insufficient damage” suggests strongly there was not enough damage to
make a home unlivable or to drastically affect the quality of life of those
in the home.  This Comment will explore how the ordinary meaning of
“insufficient damage” interplays with the doctrines of vagueness and
agency discretion.  The convergence of the two doctrines and the “ordi-
nary meaning” rule shed light on whether FEMA is properly exercising
its discretion in denying aid to low-income homeowners.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(j) (2006) (requiring that the executive branch issue regulations,
but not demanding specifically the nature of those requirements).  Specifically, the statute
says the president “shall prescribe rules and regulations to carry out this section, including
criteria, standards, and procedures for determining eligibility for assistance.” Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(b) (2006) (allowing FEMA to handle discrimination regulations
as it deems necessary); 42 U.S.C. § 5164 (2006) (allowing FEMA to make relief-assistance
rules “as may be necessary and proper”).  The President can exercise his discretion “di-
rectly, or through such Federal agency as the President may designate, any power or au-
thority conferred to the President by this chapter.” Id.
28. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (requiring that courts apply an
ordinary meaning to a term that statute fails to define).  In Dolan, a customer sued the
U.S. Postal Service under the Federal Tort Claims Act after she tripped over mail she
alleged was negligently left on her porch. Id. at 483. The court laboriously interpreted the
term “negligent transmission” according to its ordinary meaning since it was not defined in
statute. Id. at 486.
29. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (“In the absence
of . . . a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural
meaning.”).
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B. Federal Agencies Have Historically Left Low-Income Disaster
Victims Stranded
Unfortunately, the vague FEMA policy is not the only circumstance in
which the federal government has acted in ways harmful to low-income
natural disaster victims.  The government’s policies are at times discrimi-
natory and often inconsistently applied. This Comment will analyze the
legal issues surrounding government discrimination in the context of Hur-
ricane Katrina and other natural disasters and will consider discrimina-
tory acts and alleged discriminatory acts by FEMA and other federal
agencies.
Government discrimination received worldwide attention following
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 when the government made a delayed and, at
times, insufficient response to helping thousands of low-income individu-
als in New Orleans.30  Many of the cases brought in federal courts follow-
ing the delayed federal response involved allegations of racial
discrimination.31  However, it was impossible to ignore that most of the
people who were victimized by racial discrimination also lived in poverty,
or were members of other protected classes under federal law.  Many ad-
vocacy groups continue working to alleviate the discrimination they en-
countered after Hurricane Katrina, and their work includes providing aid
to low-income disaster victims.32
30. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY & GOV’T AFFAIRS, HURRICANE KATRINA: A
NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. REP. NO. 109-322 at 3 (2006), available at http://www.gpo
access.gov/serialset/creports/katrinanation.html (finding the government’s response to
Hurricane Katrina was inadequate).  Some members of Congress advocated the removal of
FEMA from is place under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security, citing
the poor response to Katrina as evidence that the existing bureaucratic structure was not
working. Id. at 721.  They explained that the director of FEMA should be able to have a
direct line to the President in times of disaster without going through the bureaucracy of
Homeland Security. Id.  The Senate report found that “Hurricane Katrina provided count-
less examples of federal assets not being deployed quickly enough, such as the delayed
arrival of active-duty military in a chaotic New Orleans, possibly due to the lack of author-
ity and clarity in the tasking orders.” Id. at 722 (footnote omitted).
31. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 723 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18 (D.D.C. 2010) (denying motion by HUD to transfer the case to
a court in New Orleans from the D.C. District Court).  Plaintiffs alleged that HUD used a
formula in distributing money from the Road Home Program that discriminated against
African-Americans. Id.  Specifically, they alleged that the awarding “ha[d] a discrimina-
tory disparate impact on African[-]Americans living in historically segregated communi-
ties.” Id.  Awards were based on the value of a home before the hurricane hit, and since
African-Americans were more likely to live in less expensive homes, they automatically
received less money from the federal government for repairs. Id.
32. See, e.g., NOW Board Calls for Disaster Planning Without Discrimination, NAT’L
ORG. FOR WOMEN (Sept. 27, 2005), http://www.now.org/issues/economic/092705katrinares-
olution.html (calling for the federal government to remove discriminatory elements of its
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Furthermore, federal agencies have been accused of discrimination
against low-income homeowners in a variety of other circumstances that
both include and go beyond the response to Hurricane Katrina.  For ex-
ample, after Hurricane Andrew, low-income homeowners in Florida
claimed they were targets of the government when they tried to obtain
shelter.33  Furthermore, residents in another Katrina lawsuit prevailed
when a court held that the government should have been clearer about
what activities might qualify the litigants for housing assistance.34
C. Federal Agencies Discriminate Despite Congressional Direction to
the Contrary
Congress has made efforts to ensure that low-income people do not
suffer discrimination at the hands of federal agencies that are determin-
ing how to distribute post-disaster aid.35  The Stafford Act, which autho-
rizes agencies to distribute disaster aid, specifically prohibits economic
discrimination.36
disaster-planning policies).  The group calls attention to discrimination against sex, race,
ethnic origin, marital status, parenthood, physical abilities, and mental abilities. Id.  In
calling attention to discrimination against the aforementioned groups, the National Organ-
ization for Women also addresses many issues particular to low-income discrimination. Id.
In a declaration, the group states that “rescue boats were not allowed to enter low-income,
flooded, mostly African-American areas because it was ‘too dangerous.’” Id. The docu-
ment also points to the government’s decision to leave mostly low-income residents
stranded for several days without supplies at the Superdome, convention center, and public
hospital, resulting in deaths. Id.
33. Lockett v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 836 F. Supp. 847, 850 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
Following the destruction in South Florida caused by Hurricane Andrew in 1992,
thousands of Floridians were left without homes. Id.  The low-income residents exper-
ienced more difficultly in receiving housing assistance from the government than their
high-income neighbors. Id.  They asserted that FEMA policies “systematically precluded
many low-income residents displaced by the hurricane from receiving any form of tempo-
rary housing assistance.” Id. at 851.
34. McWaters v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 436 F. Supp.2d 802, 803 (E.D. La.
2006) (holding that FEMA should have stressed to residents that receiving a Small Busi-
ness Administration loan was not a prerequisite for receiving housing assistance from the
government).  Admittedly, plaintiffs were not successful in convincing the court to recog-
nize economic discrimination against low-income people. Id.  In so finding, the court gave
the government leeway due to the massive size of the rescue and recovery efforts. Id. at
824.  To the government’s benefit, the court reasoned: “Even the most sensitive and pre-
pared of government actors would have struggled with the magnitude of Katrina, and inev-
itably those with economic resources will recover more quickly than those without.” Id.
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2006) (explaining rules for impartial disaster relief); see
also Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-295, 120 Stat.
1355, 1394 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (making structural changes to
FEMA).
36. § 5151(a).  The Stafford Act requires that “the processing of applications, and
other relief and assistance activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and impartial
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Congress also discourages economic discrimination in other circum-
stances. For example, the federal government does not allow medical
providers who receive a federal public-health scholarship to discriminate
against low-income patients in their health practices.37  Similarly, Con-
gress has prohibited employers who offer legal benefit plans to their em-
ployees from discriminating in favor of the workers who make the most
money.38  These policies demonstrate the government’s aversion to ex-
press discrimination against low-income individuals.
An analysis of income-based discrimination after natural disasters must
be broader than natural disaster policy itself.  Many people in poverty
suffer discrimination after a natural disaster, not because the government
implements malicious disaster-aid policies, but rather because of long-
standing economic discrimination that existed before disaster struck.  In
times of disaster, the government makes great efforts to help the poor, as
is apparent from an array of government policies designed to reach out to
the needy in the wake of tragedy.39  However, any pre-existing discrimi-
nation against the poor is magnified during times of disaster, exacerbating
the effect of a hurricane, flood, or earthquake.40  The idea is not unique
to the United States; worldwide, discriminatory policies in times of calm
translate to discriminatory policies in times of disaster.41  The effect of
disaster on low-income people is exacerbated simply because they have
fewer resources with which to cushion themselves from tragedy compared
to people with moderate or high salaries.
manner, without discrimination on the grounds of . . . economic status.” Id.  The statute
also prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, nationality, sex, age,
[and] disability . . . .” Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 254n(b)(1)(B) (2006) (relating to the rules under which recipients of
certain government funds must conduct their healthcare practices.)  The statute requires
compliance with the requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 254g (2006), which prohibits “dis-
criminat[ion] in the provision of services” if a person either cannot pay, or if the person
will be using government insurance provided under the Social Security Act—namely,
Medicaid and Medicare. Id.
38. 26 U.S.C. § 120(c)(1) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in favor of highly com-
pensated workers).
39. § 5151(a) (explaining rules for impartial disaster relief designed to aid those in
need).
40. See Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, May
14–20, 2001, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Poverty and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.191/BP/7 (May 13, 2001),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/aconf191bp_7.en.pdf (explaining that the need
for helping disadvantaged people continues to exist during times of disaster).  Nations and
international bodies have a responsibility to help poor people secure basic needs. Id. at ¶
17. “[B]ecause core obligations are non-derogable, they continue to exist in situations of
conflict, emergency and natural disaster.” Id. at ¶ 18.
41. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. FEMA’s Policy is Too Vague to be Consistently Applied
FEMA’s “insufficient damage” policy is discriminatorily vague when
analyzed according to courts’ assessments of both agency rules and stat-
utes.  Although the FEMA policy is neither a statute nor a rule, it shares
characteristics of statutes and rules in that it guides the manner in which
the agency carries out its mission and is thus analogous to statutes and
rules.  Courts have frowned upon agency rules that are impermissibly
vague.42
i. Impermissibly Vague: Rules
A rule is vague if it meets two standards: first, the rule requires a per-
son of ordinary intelligence to engage in a guessing game as to its mean-
ing; and second, the rule gives broad discretion to an enforcer as to
whether it applies in a particular situation.43
In this circumstance, FEMA told homeowners only that “insufficient
damage” is grounds for denial.  Persons of ordinary intelligence could
reasonably come to wildly differing conclusions as to the meaning of “in-
sufficient damage.”  To illustrate, three likely interpretations of “insuffi-
cient” that a person of ordinary intelligence might reach include an
assessment of: the livability of a home, visibility of damage, or monetary
damage.  A person using the “livability” standard might deem a home
sufficiently damaged that appears in good repair to the naked eye but
suffers from an invisible problem such as mold infestation, making the
home non-compliant with modern health and safety standards and, there-
fore, unlivable.  However, another person who assesses the damage based
on the level of visibility could find the same mold-infested home to be
42. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 518 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (condemning the vagueness of the Health and Human Services Commission rule,
which “appears to be nothing more than a precatory statement of purpose that imposes no
substantive restrictions”); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (instructing the Trade Commission to develop a definitive interpretation of its
procedural rule).  An agency must provide clear interpretations of its rules so that those
who rely upon the rules have appropriate notice as to the agency’s intentions in enforcing
them. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 567 F.2d at 103.
43. Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 240 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a prison rule prohibit-
ing “any item” and all smuggling was unconstitutionally vague as applied to a prisoner who
had contraband in his cell).  The prisoner was found with two envelopes of papers and
seven copies of a book entitled The Politics of Parole. Id. at 237–38.  He was a member of
a group called the “Long Termers Committee,” which worked to change the criminal jus-
tice system from inside the prisons. Id. at 237.  The court held that the statute did not give
Farid proper notice that his book was contraband and did not constrain the guards in their
manner of application of the rule. Id. at 241.
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insufficiently damaged simply because the damage is invisible to the na-
ked eye.  A third person using the criterion of economic damage could
concur with either the first or second person depending solely on the
amount of monetary damage caused by the disaster.  If the mold could be
removed for a nominal fee, the inspector would agree with the person
using the “visibility” standard that the damage is insufficient, whereas if
the mold could be removed only through high-priced mediation the dam-
age would be sufficient.  Therefore, the FEMA policy fails the first prong
of the “impermissibly vague” test because a person of ordinary intelli-
gence would have to engage in speculation as to the meaning of “insuffi-
cient damage.”
The second prong of the “impermissibly vague” test requires that a rule
give specific direction as to its enforcement requirements.44  The “insuffi-
cient damage” category provides little or no apparent direction to FEMA
workers as to how they should enforce or apply the policy, giving agency
employees charged with enforcement of the rule wide latitude and the
freedom to interpret the term in any number of ways.45  Therefore, the
“insufficient damage” policy fails the second prong of the vagueness test
because it lacks specific direction for enforcers to follow.46
ii. Impermissibly Vague: Statues
Court decisions involving statutory vagueness are instructive in analyz-
ing whether the “insufficient damage” policy is impermissibly vague.  In
analyzing whether a statute is vague, courts consider whether it provides
fair notice to the public.47  In short, the danger of a vague statute is that
parties do not have a clear sense of the law and are thus not informed
enough to know whether and how they are violating the law.48  The
44. Id. (requiring direction in the way a rule or statute is applied).  A court must
“‘consider whether the law provides explicit standards for those who apply it.’” Id. (quot-
ing Chatin v. Coombe, 186 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1999)).
45. See Farid, 593 F.3d at 240 (holding a rule to be unconstitutionally vague when it
didn’t provide proper notice and failed to “adequately constrain” those charged with its
enforcement).
46. See id. (laying out the second prong of the vagueness test).
47. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999) (finding a Chicago city ordi-
nance unconstitutionally vague because it required loiterers to disperse after receiving a
warning to disperse from a police officer).  The fair notice requirement is intended “to
enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law.” Id.  The Court held
that an order issued after a law was broken does not provide notice because it provides the
public with information only after the alleged illegal activity has occurred. Id. at 59.
48. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 972 (2011) (explaining the void-for-vague-
ness principal embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rele-
vant here by analogy to the undefined—thus vague—term “insufficient damage” used by
FEMA).  Courts have consistently upheld the principle that a statute must be definite to be
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homeowners affected by Hurricane Dolly—people of ordinary intelli-
gence—were unable to know with specificity how the “insufficient dam-
age” term was applied to them when they were denied assistance and
sought recourse in the federal courts.49
In a previous instance the Kansas Supreme Court struck down a statute
that outlawed “official misconduct” because it was “too indefinite to
serve as a warning.”50  The same could be said of the FEMA “insufficient
damage” policy, which is so vague that it does nothing to warn homeown-
ers of the damage necessary to qualify for disaster aid.  Therefore, the
“insufficient damage” policy is too vague under established statutory
standards because it does not provide the public with fair notice.51
B. “Ordinary Meaning” Supersedes Chevron Deference
Agencies must apply the ordinary meaning of a term if that term is not
defined in the statute.52  Here, the ordinary meaning of the term “insuffi-
cient damage” suggests that the damage is minimal, or too insignificant to
warrant repair.53  Victims of Hurricane Dolly had homes that sustained
valid. Id.  A statute is adequately definite if a person of ordinary intelligence who uses
common sense could understand and comply. Id.  By analogy, a person of ordinary intelli-
gence using common sense should be able to understand in what cases FEMA would apply
the “insufficient damage” administrative standard.
49. La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. B08487, 2009
WL 1346030, at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2009), vacated, 608 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 2010), cert
denied, 526 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 525 (2010).  The court held that, although FEMA had discre-
tion to implement the Congressional mandate to provide emergency housing money,
FEMA impermissibly duplicated the federal statute rather than making the standards
more specific and definite. Id. at *9.  FEMA’s failure to specify a definate standard in
question contradicted the Congressional mandate that the agency provide details as to how
one might qualify for aid. Id. at *10.
50. Kansas v. Adams, 866 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Kan. 1994) (holding the statute to be un-
constitutionally vague).  The court dismissed two charges of official misconduct against a
police chief, reasoning that people of ordinary intelligence could not determine exactly
what constituted misconduct. Id.  The court held that “[d]ue to the great divergence of
opinion held in our society as to what is acceptable or proper behavior, misconduct is in
the eye of the beholder.” Id. at 1023.
51. See City of Chicago, 527 U.S. at 58 (explaining the importance of the fair notice
standard in the context of city ordinances).
52. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (holding in favor of the
FDIC agency when a former employee alleged he was terminated in violation of due pro-
cess).  The Court in the Meyer case turned to Black’s Law Dictionary to determine the
ordinary meaning of the term “cognizable.” Id.
53. Insufficient-Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/insufficient (last visited July 8, 2011) (defining “insufficient” as “in-
adequate”).  An alternative definition is: “Lacking adequate power, capacity, or compe-
tence.” Id.
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massive amounts of damage from the storm.54  The damage was hardly
insignificant: roofs were damaged, plumbing destroyed, and seeping
water caused mold and mildew to grow.55  Under the ordinary meaning
of “insufficient damage,” many denied homeowners should have quali-
fied for government aid.  Therefore, FEMA in this case should not have
broad discretion because it is obligated to apply the most ordinary mean-
ing of “insufficient damage.”
Although the ordinary meaning doctrine means FEMA incorrectly ap-
plied its policy, there are many circumstances in which an agency has
broad discretion to apply the law as it sees fit.  Several arguments address
the view that FEMA acted within its rightful discretion in its application
of the policy, but each can be refuted.
Admittedly, courts have given administrative agencies broad discretion
when implementing laws.  The Fifth Circuit granted FEMA deference in
La Union del Pueblo Entero v. FEMA56 citing the agency’s adherence to
necessary standards in implementing the law.57  Specifically, the Fifth Cir-
cuit said FEMA’s actions passed both prongs of the Chevron58 deference
test and therefore were permissible, making it impossible for courts to
interfere with agency implementation of the law.59  Furthermore, courts
54. Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, $44 Million Approved to Assist
Texans Recover from Hurricane Dolly (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.fema.gov/news/news
release.fema?id=46258.  More than 38,000 people applied for disaster aid, most of which
involved some type of damage to a residence. Id. FEMA inspectors conducted 31,876
housing inspections and ultimately approved more than $30 million in aid for residential
aid under the Individuals and Households Program (IHP). Id. The IHP aid included: $25
million for temporary housing, rental assistance and home repairs, and $5 million for medi-
cal costs and other disaster-related needs that were not covered by individual victims’ in-
surance. Id.
55. La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. B08487, 2009
WL 1346030, at *9 (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2009) (granting homeowners’ request for an injunc-
tion to require FEMA to articulate specific standards used in assessing home-repair appli-
cations), vacated, 608 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 2010), cert denied, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 525
(2010).  One plaintiff, Maria Gallardo, said that after her roof leaked, her ceilings, walls,
and carpet rotted, forcing her family members to move out to avoid becoming sick from
mildew. Id. at *9.  In Francisca Perez’s home, plumbing damage caused mold and mildew
to grow. Id.  The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, and the plaintiffs peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. Id. at *10.
56. 608 F.3d 217, (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 525 (2010).
57. Id.
58. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
59. La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 608 F.3d 217,
223–24, cert. denied, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 525 (2010); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (giving deference to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency in its interpretation of air-quality laws).  The Chevron Court
applied a two-step rule: first, when Congress speaks unambiguously, Congress’ intent must
be implemented without respect to agency decision. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.  Second,
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have repeatedly found FEMA’s actions to be judicially unreviewable
when those actions are informed by statute and are not arbitrary or
capricious.60
However, FEMA’s actions after Hurricane Dolly are distinguishable
from its action in other disasters because actions following other disasters
were not based on impermissibly vague policies.  Notably, courts that af-
firmed FEMA’s broad discretion did not address the “insufficient dam-
age” policy, but instead dealt with various other agency actions.  The
FEMA response to Hurricane Dolly was so far outside accepted stan-
dards that it could be considered discriminatory.61  Therefore, FEMA ac-
ted outside its discretion in creating and enforcing its “insufficient
damage” policy because the policy was sufficiently vague as to overstep
the agency deference otherwise granted to agencies.
C. The Government Has Historically Treated Low-Income Disaster
Victims Differently from High-Income Disaster Victims
i. The Poor Often Must Prove Discrimination by Race
Poverty itself is not a protected status under the Constitution; there-
fore, lawsuits alleging discrimination based on poverty are less likely to
prevail than those based on other protected statuses.62  Furthermore, eco-
nomic discrimination is not expressly prohibited in important housing leg-
islation, including the Fair Housing Act.63  Because of these omissions in
the Constitution and federal statutes, there is not a large body of case law
documenting discrimination based solely on poverty.  Instead, low-in-
when Congress leaves room for agency interpretation, courts must defer to the agency’s
interpretation as long as it is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute.” Id. at 844.
60. See e.g., St. Tammany Parish v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 556 F.3d 307, 323
(5th Cir. 2009) (holding FEMA actions in tort unreviewable by the court because they are
“grounded in social, economic, and political policy”); Calif.-Nev. Methodist Homes, Inc. v.
Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 152 F.Supp. 2d 1202, 1208 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that
FEMA’s decision to deny request for earthquake relief funds was unreviewable by court);
City of San Bruno v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 181 F.Supp. 2d 1010, 1015 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (finding FEMA’s decision to deny the city discretionary funds to be discretionary
rather than arbitrary and capricious, and thus the decision was allowed under the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act).
61. See La Union Del Pueblo Entero, 2009 WL 1346030, at *9–10 (detailing the inju-
ries alleged by the plaintiffs and concluding that by outlining specific criteria, FEMA could
have alleviated many of their injuries).
62. Banks v. United States, No. 05-6853, 2007 WL 1030326, at *7 (E.D. La. March 28,
2007) (holding that poverty is not itself a protected class); see also Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (explaining that an amendment that directly impacts the indigent is
not necessarily unconstitutional, because poverty is not a suspect class).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in real-estate and related
transactions).
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come disaster victims more commonly file lawsuits alleging discrimina-
tion based on a protected status, such as race.64
Because income is not a protected status, legal challenges by low-in-
come people to the government’s disaster response come in the form of
racial discrimination allegations.  For example, plaintiffs have alleged that
the federal government violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution when it responded with great delay to the predominantly
African-American city of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina.65  In
one lawsuit, a federal court agreed with African-American plaintiffs that
the federal Road Home program designed to help rebuild after Hurri-
cane Katrina was discriminatory against African-Americans.66  The Road
Home is a massive housing recovery project—in fact, the largest in U.S.
history—funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment designed to return people to homes or rental units after hurri-
canes Katrina and Rita in 2005.67  In Louisiana, the program offered
homeowners up to $150,000 to obtain housing in one of three ways: stay-
ing in their home, buying another home in Louisiana, or selling their
home without buying another in the state.68  However, the program
granted money to rebuild homes based on the pre-disaster value of the
home.69  The result was that African-Americans consistently received
lower amounts of government aid than did White homeowners because
the homes in African-American neighborhoods were consistently worth
less than homes of comparable size, age, and construction located in
White neighborhoods.70
64. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 723 F. Supp. 2d 14, 16 (D.D.C. 2010) (asserting that the formula used to
allocate grants to homeowners following Hurricane Katrina had a “racially discriminatory
effect”).
65. Michael Kogut, Making the Case: Did the Government’s Response to Hurricane
Katrina Violate the Equal Protection Clause?, 11 SCHOLAR 127, 128 (2009) (concluding that
victims of Hurricane Katrina could likely not succeed in an Equal Protection challenge to
the government because the court-imposed “intent” requirement would be too difficult to
prove).
66. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., 723 F. Supp. 2d at 16–17 (granting a
preliminary injunction on the grounds that plaintiffs were likely to prevail in their allega-
tions that the HUD formula had a discriminatory impact on African-American
homeowners).
67. Office of Community Development-Disaster Relief, LOUSIANA.GOV, http://doa.lou-
isiana.gov/cdbg/DRHousing.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2010).
68. Id.
69. David Hammer, Road Home’s Grant Calculations Discriminate Against Black
Homeowners, Federal Judge Rules, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.nola.
com/politics/index.ssf/2010/08/dc_federal_judge_finds_road_ho.html.
70. Id.
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The City of New Orleans was a deeply divided city by both race and
socioeconomic status before the hurricane, and that division became
more apparent after the storm, according to a StoryCorps New Orleans
interview with “Smitty” Smith, a native of the hard-hit Lower Ninth Ward
and a former labor organizer.71  Smith remembers a New Orleans where
African-Americans were separate from Whites, and were poorer than
Whites.72  Although there was talk of integration of the South after the
Civil Rights Movement, but true integration eluded the city with the ex-
ception of Mardi Gras and other festivals; integration was not a reality of
everyday life in New Orleans.73  “The culture of the South permeated
New Orleans in spite of all of its chatter about this, that, and the other,
the so-called . . . race-mingling is largely a myth.  The place was strict in
its order of things . . . .  On an everyday social and economic basis, it was
strict because you were in the Deep South.”74  The racial and socio-eco-
nomic divisions that existed before the storm were magnified after the
disaster.
People like Lucrece Phillips witnessed the devastation of the poor,
largely African-American Ninth Ward in New Orleans.75  Phillips, forty-
two, was rescued along with five of her family members and a friend from
the attic of her Ninth Ward home the day waters flooded the city and left
thousands homeless or dead.76  Her house was ruined; her neighbors
downstairs, a forty-one-year-old woman and her five-year-old son, were
trapped before the current swept them to their deaths.77  “I can still hear
them banging on the ceiling for help,” she told a Times-Picayune reporter
the day she was rescued.78  “I heard them banging and banging, but the
water kept rising.”79  Phillips is one of many who live in African-Ameri-
can neighborhoods that not only suffer disproportionately after natural
disasters, but also have significantly smaller pots of money than their
White neighbors from which to rebuild.80
71. Interview by Nick Karel with Ward ‘Mac’ McLendon & J.F. ‘Smitty’ Smith in New
Orleans, La. (Mar. 2010), in Bruce Nolan, StoryCorps New Orleans: Lower 9th Ward Re-
sidents Reflect on the Power of People, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.
nola.com/storycorps/index.ssf/2010/04/storycorps_new_orleans_lower_9.html (click the




75. Trymaine D. Lee, Nightmare in the 9th Ward All Too Real for One Woman, THE





80. Kogut, supra note 65.
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ii. The Federal Government Has a Long, Unfortunate History of
Discriminating Against Low-Income Disaster Victims
Hannibal, Missouri, is the storied hometown of Mark Twain, a fact that
the well-to-do residents and government officials of the town value be-
cause of the town’s prominence as a tourist attraction.81  Afraid the his-
torical sites of Twain’s childhood would one day be threatened by
flooding of the adjacent Mississippi River, the town enlisted the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers in 1985 to build a 3,000-foot floodwall through
town that would protect the historical areas but leave the poor residents
exposed and vulnerable to a flood.82  When the river flooded in 1993, the
town’s poor communities were devastated.83  One resident lamented:
“They put in a flood wall to save Mark Twain’s house and all the stuff
about that dead man, so I don’t know why they don’t help the living.”84
The Hannibal flood was one of many in which the federal government
encouraged and funded disaster-related projects that served to protect
the wealthy and middle class at the direct expense of the poor.85
At times, discriminatory disaster policy has been evident in local gov-
ernments as well.  In 1992, voters in the City of San Francisco passed an
initiative creating a $350 million loan fund for property owners to retrofit
their buildings in order to make them more resistant to earthquake dam-
age.86  The city could have saved more lives if it passed a slightly higher
bond amount, but chose not to do so.87  The decision was economical, but
may also have been discriminatory against the city’s Chinese residents,
who lived in the areas most likely to crumble in an earthquake, argues
author Ted Steinberg in his book, Acts of God: The Unnatural History of
Natural Disaster in America.88  “Whose lives are we talking about here?
Clearly, the lives of some are worth more than others.”89
Furthermore, government and non-profit organizations focus on get-
ting homeowners back into their homes after disasters, but renters—who
often have less money—have historically been left to the devices of the
81. TED STEINBERG, ACTS OF GOD: THE UNNATURAL HISTORY OF NATURAL DISAS-
TER IN AMERICA xvii (2000).
82. Id. at xvi–xvii.  The twelve-foot wall cost $8 million to build, and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers paid for most of it. Id. at xvi.
83. Id. at xvii.  The flood was the worst in the city’s history and of such strength it is
expected only once every 500 years. Id. at xvi.  It brought the river’s waters thirty-two feet
high, spilling over the wall. Id.
84. Id. at xvii.
85. Id.
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private sector and at times left homeless.90  For example, a disproportion-
ate number of the evacuees who left New Orleans after Hurricane Ka-
trina were renters, and many of them struggled to survive in their new
cities after the federal government ended rental assistance.91  Although
the government ended the program after a twenty-six-month stretch of
rent-free housing for recipients, which was significantly longer than the
Congressionally mandated eighteen months of assistance, the end of as-
sistance marked the beginning of harder times for victims.92  The mem-
bers of one family found themselves eating more beans and less meat
once the rental assistance program ended in order to have enough money
to pay for utilities.93  One scholar found that the government relegates
renters’ recovery to a lower priority than it does recovery of homeown-
ers.94  In an academic study, researchers at the University of California at
Berkeley studied disaster aid to victims of the 1989 Loma Prieta earth-
quake in California.95  They found that homeowners, largely middle-class,
received sixty-two percent of the $1 billion in home-repair funds even
90. Charles W. Gould, The Right to Housing Recovery After Natural Disasters, 22
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 185–86 (2009) (establishing that the law and disaster writings pay
little heed to how renters recover).  Gould argues that getting renters back into housing
after a disaster is a complicated project. Id. at 185. “Renters have been called both the
easiest and the hardest households to return to permanent housing”; they are easy because
they could move to any number of properties, but they are hard when no rental properties
are available. Id. He argues that, “[d]istressingly, governments and NGOs tend to see
rental housing as within the private sector and thereby leave some of the lowest-income
individuals and families at particular risk.” Id. at 186.
91. See Kristin Carlisle, Katrina Evacuees in Texas Remain in Limbo, SHELTERFORCE:
J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY BUILDING, Fall 2006, available at http://www.nhi.
org/online/issues/147/texasevacuees.html (telling the story of a former resident of New Or-
leans who is struggling to make ends meet after FEMA ended her housing assistance).
FEMA’s operation was the largest rental program in United States history, housing at one
point 143,000 people. Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, FEMA Temporary
Housing Program Ending for Families of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Apr. 7, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=47936 (indicating that the various
assistance under FEMA would end May 1, 2009).
92. Press Release, Federal Emergency Management Agency, supra note 91.
93. Carlisle, supra note 91.  Some disaster victims pondered the serious consequences
of FEMA’s decision to halt rental aid to needy, displaced families. Id. “I really hate that
FEMA had to make the decision not to help people with rental assistance, because there
are some people out there that really do need it,” said Gaynell Bogan, a forty-five-year-old
New Orleans resident who was living in Austin, Texas, following Hurricane Katrina.  “I
guess they feel like ‘we can’t take care of you forever’ . . . but people are not living in good
situations right now.” Id.
94. Gould, supra note 90.  One reason rental units are less likely to receive govern-
ment disaster aid is that they are subject to a more complicated ownership structure, often
involving multiple parties, than are single-family units. Id.
95. Rich Connell, Disaster Aid Uneven, Study Says: Recovery: UC Berkely Report on
Bay Area Quake Finds That Most Relief Efforts Help Middle-Class Homeowners Rather
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though they accounted for only forty percent of the damaged units.96
Therefore, the government’s lack of attention to rental units, in both the
length and amount of housing assistance, contributes to low-income rent-
ers’ difficulty in finding stability after a disaster.
In America’s heartland, a long history of tornadoes has left disaster
victims intimately acquainted with economic discrimination by the fed-
eral government.  Since 1953, tornadoes in the United States have
prompted FEMA to declare 410 disasters.97  Tornadoes can occur on any
continent, but the United States sees more than any other nation—about
1,000 every year.98  Most form in one of two places: Florida or a section
of the Southern Plains known as Tornado Alley.99  The region earns its
nickname because it is where cold, polar air meets warmer air, making it
the ideal climate for brewing tornados.100  Greensburg, Kansas, is one of
the communities in Tornado Alley.101  Like other communities in the re-
gion, it lacks large industry, has lower-than-average incomes, and is gen-
erally less affluent than much of the coastal United States.102  Therefore,
because of the lower incomes in many places in Tornado Alley, residents
are more vulnerable to financial destruction when a disaster hits; subse-
quent economic discrimination by the government makes that destruction
even more devastating.
The median household income in the United States in 2009 was
$51,425, whereas the median household income in Kiowa County, Kan-
sas, where Greensburg is located, is $38,750.103  On May 4, 2007, an EF-5
tornado—the highest level—hit the town, leaving enormous amounts of
Than Apartment Dwellers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1994, http://articles.latimes.com/1994-03-02/
news/mn-28984_1_bay-area-quake.
96. Id. (explaining findings of the UC Berkeley study).  The study offered some sug-
gested recommendations for improving the aid process: distribute aid more evenly between
houses and apartments, streamline the application process, and offer incentives to en-
courage rapid repair of rental housing after disasters. Id.
97. Declared Disasters by Year or State, supra note 20.
98. U.S. Tornado Climatology, NAT’L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., http://www.ncdc.noaa.




102. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2005-2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2009), avail-
able at http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en (under “Fast Access to
Information,” enter “Greensburg City” in the city/town text box, select Kansas from the
state dropdown and then click on “Go”). In Greensburg, the 2009 per capita income was
$21,248; in the United States, the per capita income for the same year was $27,041. Id.
103. Id.
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destruction.104  Town landmarks, a school, a water tower, a hospital, city
hall, and a power plant were destroyed, as were homes and businesses.105
The damage was so widespread that townspeople, many of them with low
or moderate incomes, had to relocate, causing the population of Greens-
burg to plummet.106  Steve Hewitt, the city administrator, said the town
was working-class: “‘Before, it was the typical small town . . . .  We were
just trying to hang in there and get by.  We were dealing with life day to
day.’”107  The Greensburg tornado illustrates how tornadoes often affect
low-income, rural residents already living on the edge of survival and who
can be pushed to the brink of financial devastation if the government
discriminates against them during recovery.
After the Greensburg tornado FEMA charged Greensburg residents to
live in temporary trailers.  This prompted the White, low-income victims
there to accuse the government of racism because Black, low-income vic-
tims of Hurricane Katrina were not required to pay a similar rental fee.108
Regardless of its veracity, such an allegation illuminates the bitter feel-
ings and anger that some low-income people have when they perceive
FEMA’s actions to be in some way discriminatory.109
In every kind of natural disaster, domestic or foreign, poor people are
in the worst possible position to withstand discrimination when a disaster
strikes.  They are the least likely to have savings, insurance, and other aid
to buffer them from the harsh results of a natural disaster.110  A World
Development report in 2000 interviewed poor people who were victims
of natural disaster and relayed one victim’s thought: “[Security is] the
ability of persons to cope with disasters.”111  Without the ability to buy
food, secure shelter, find a job, and pay for medical care, coping with
disaster is exceedingly difficult, and victims’ lives are plunged into
uncertainty.112
104. Beccy Tanner, On Tornado Anniversary, Greensburg Reflects, THE WICHITA EA-
GLE, Apr. 20, 2010, http://www.kansas.com/2010/04/20/1277208/on-tornado-anniversary-
town-reflects.html.
105. Id.
106. Id.  The population fell by approximately 500. Id.
107. Id.
108. Why Would FEMA Charge the Victims of the Greensburg Kansas Tornado $667




110. WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001: ATTACKING
POVERTY 162 (2001), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Re-
sources/WDR/English-Full-Text-Report/ch9.pdf.
111. Id. at 161.
112. Id. at 162.
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iii. Bureaucratic Roadblocks Contribute to Discrimination
Perhaps the seemingly discriminatory actions of the federal govern-
ment in distributing aid and helping in recovery are a result of inefficient
bureaucracy rather than blatant malice or intentional discrimination on
the part of government workers.  FEMA has limited resources and must
allocate the resources Congress gives it with great care.113  If the agency
must make sure it distributes money in the wisest way possible, then it
must necessarily not distribute money to every homeowner, business, or
citizen who claims to have suffered a loss in a natural disaster.
In 2010, the director of FEMA warned that the agency’s emergency
funds had been depleted from a string of disasters, including flooding in
Tennessee and tornadoes elsewhere.114  FEMA Director Craig Fugate
said he would have to ask for supplemental budget money from Congress
simply to pay for the spring disasters and ensure that some money re-
mained for potential hurricanes during the summer and fall.115  The
agency had to cut back on some of its normal operations until the supple-
mental bill was passed later in the spring.116 “‘So we have limited our
funds to just those things that are necessary to do a response, to meet
initial needs, take care of individuals, the survivors of disaster, but we
have stopped all of our permanent work until we get a supplemental to
support that,’ Fugate said.”117  As with funds, FEMA employees’ time is
limited, and their outstanding caseloads can lead to less-than-perfect dis-
tribution of funds.118  Therefore, allegations of discrimination against
FEMA should be considered alongside the agency’s limited resources.119
Another possible bureaucratic roadblock to fair and equal distribution
of emergency funds after a natural disaster involves the lack of inter-
agency cooperation in natural disasters.  Specifically, Congress has made
it difficult for the President to use all of the resources at his disposal in
113. See generally FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, FY 2010 BUDGET
REQUEST (2009), available at http://www.apco911.org/new/commcenter911/downloads/
FEMA%20FY2010%20Association%20Rollout%20Slides.pdf (outlining the budget pro-
posal for 2010).  FEMA requested almost $10.5 billion in appropriations from Congress for
Fiscal Year 2010. Id.
114. Sam Youngman, FEMA Director Says Emergency Relief Funds are Running





118. See McWaters v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 436 F. Supp.2d 802, 805 (E.D.
La. 2006) (providing that all thirteen plaintiffs did not receive any assistance after Hurri-
cane Katrina, even at the time this case was filed).
119. See id. (identifying the plaintiffs’ attempt to claim that FEMA violated the Staf-
ford Act in their course of dealing with Hurricane Katrina).
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responding to natural disasters.120  The government could respond more
effectively to natural disasters if the President were authorized to order
the Reserve troops to help domestic disaster response in addition to the
National Guard troops that he is already authorized deploy in such
circumstances.121
Although the Reserve has responded in small ways to disasters such as
Hurricane Katrina and the 2007 California wildfires, its response has
been minimal and leaves many resources left unused even as people suf-
fer from a disaster.122  Colonel Kevin Cieply, author of a law review arti-
cle titled Charting a New Role for Title 10 Reserve Forces, argues that
“[t]he Reserve’s relatively small contribution to natural disaster relief in
the past, however, does not reflect its vast potential to serve the nation in
the future during times of natural catastrophe.”123  It is especially impor-
tant that the nation be able to use all available response resources in to-
day’s world where diseases can spread rapidly, climate change threatens
more natural disasters, and the nation’s aging infrastructure poses
dangers.124
In this atmosphere, “it is imperative for the military to bring its pleth-
ora of military capabilities to bear on all contingencies in support of civil
authorities.”125  Cieply does not make a discrimination argument, but the
lack of integrated disaster response arguably has a discriminatory effect
on the poorest disaster victims because they have less to lose when gov-
ernment fails to respond efficiently; they hit rock bottom faster.126  If a
tornado victim who is a waitress in rural Oklahoma with only $100 in her
bank account and a ruined home has to wait for two weeks for the gov-
ernment to arrive with a temporary trailer or tent, she will be homeless
and destitute during that time.  By comparison, a wealthy oil magnate in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, who loses his house to a tornado will never be home-
less or destitute but will pay for a hotel, fly to another city, or stay with
wealthy friends.  In short, the wealthy oil magnate will in no way suffer if
federal officials’ response is delayed, whereas the low-income waitress
will rely on the government aid as the only buffer standing between her
120. Kevin Cieply, Charting a New Role for Title 10 Reserve Forces: A Total Force
Response to Natural Disasters, 196 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3, 6–8 (2008).
121. Id. at 11–14. Cieply argues that the law “discriminates against the reserve, mak-
ing it difficult—although not impossible—for the reserve to deploy for natural disaster
response.” Id. at 2.
122. Id. at 6.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Cieply, supra note 120, at 6.
126. See generally id. at 1 (identifying a natural disaster victim’s urgent need for
assistance).
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and homelessness.  Therefore, if implemented, Cieply’s argument that the
President should be allowed to use Reserve troops to help respond would
necessarily help low-income disaster victims more than wealthy
victims.127
iv. Congress Has Explicitly Ordered Parity in Treatment of Disaster
Victims
Economic discrimination against disaster victims is not systemic in
American government, but rather the result of poorly executed adminis-
trative policy.  As evidence, Congress specifically forbids economic dis-
crimination in the distribution of federal disaster aid under the Stafford
Act, which establishes the groundwork for disaster aid:
The President shall issue, and may alter and amend, such regulations
as may be necessary for the guidance of personnel carrying out Fed-
eral assistance functions at the site of a major disaster or emergency.
Such regulations shall include provisions for insuring that the distri-
bution of supplies, the processing of applications, and other relief
and assistance activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and
impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race,
color, religion, nationality, sex, age, disability, English proficiency, or
economic status.128
Courts have interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 5151 to mean that no economic dis-
crimination is acceptable, even if the discrimination disfavors someone
because of his or her elevated financial status.129  Under the Stafford Act,
government officials can no more discriminate against a person for his or
her “successfulness” than they can discriminate against a person for his or
her low income.130
Other non-disaster statutes are also instructive because they demon-
strate that Congress has a history of insisting that low-income people
should not be disfavored when federal funds are distributed for certain
programs.  For example, the federal government does not allow medical
providers who received federal public-health scholarships to discriminate
127. See generally id. (recognizing the importance of allowing the President to use
Reserve troops when responding to a natural disaster).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
129. Maleche v. Solis, 692 F. Supp. 2d 679, 691–92 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that the
Stafford Act disallows discrimination based on economic status even when the plaintiff
claims he was discriminated against for his “successfulness”).  However, the court granted
summary judgment on other grounds.
130. Id. at 693.
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against low-income patients in their health practices.131  Similarly, Con-
gress has prohibited employers who offer legal benefit plans to their em-
ployees from discriminating in favor of the workers who make the most
money.132
Federal housing policy also demonstrates a preference for those with
low incomes.  For example, a low-income housing program gives prefer-
ence to those with limited incomes with the goal of “aiding low-income
families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically
mixed housing.”133  These policies favoring the poor in the areas of health
care, legal aid, and housing demonstrate Congress’s aversion to express
discrimination against low-income individuals.  In fact, a great number of
government programs are designed to favor low-income individuals who
Congress has determined deserve additional help because they have suf-
fered historic discrimination or because of other factors.134
Furthermore, following Congress’s lead, federal agencies have imple-
mented their own rules that expressly forbid discrimination along eco-
nomic lines.  As shown above, FEMA has repeatedly been accused of
treating the poor differently than the wealthy, and at least one court
agreed with those making the allegations.135  However, if the agency were
to follow its own codified rules it would not engage in such discrimina-
tion.136  For example, 44 C.F.R. § 206.11(b), promulgated by FEMA,
states that economic discrimination in distributing disaster aid is prohib-
ited.137  All government employees or organizations working with the
government to distribute aid “shall perform their work in an equitable
and impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race,
131. 42 U.S.C. § 254n (2006) (relating to the rules under which recipients of the
money must conduct their practices).  The 2000 version of the statute explains that “the
individual in providing health services in connection with such practice (i) shall not dis-
criminate against any person on the basis of such person’s ability to pay for such services or
because payment for the health services.”  § 254n (b)(1)(B).
132. 26 U.S.C. § 120(c)(1) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in favor of highly com-
pensated workers).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006) (explaining authorization for payments under low-
income housing assistance programs).
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 254 (2006) (listing various programs, including health care, ad-
dressing lack of health care in certain areas, etc.); § 1437f(a) (providing a program for
economically disadvantaged individuals to obtain housing assistance).
135. See Ridgely v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 512 F.3d 727 (5th Cir. 2008)
(holding plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory claims against FEMA to be without merit,
but cautioning FEMA to be clearer and more timely in communicating their decision re-
garding housing assistance).
136. 44 C.F.R. § 206.11(a)–(b) (2010) (conditioning federal aid to states on “full com-
pliance with 44 CFR part 7, Nondiscrimination in Federally-Assisted Programs”).
137. § 206.11(b).
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color, religion, nationality, sex, age, or economic status.”138  The very ex-
istence of the rule suggests that FEMA is not engaging in malicious dis-
crimination, but rather is not implementing its own rules in a non-
discriminatory manner for various reasons.139  Because FEMA rules for-
bid economic discrimination and the “insufficient damage” rule furthers
discrimination, the agency is acting contrary to its own rules.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Congress Must Join Governments of Other Nations in Recognizing
Housing as a Human Right
Congress should recognize that all people have a right to shelter.140
Long before the dawn of modern government, humans have needed shel-
ter to survive and reach their potential.141  For example, Maslow’s famous
hierarchy of human needs places shelter somewhere in either the first or
second level of natural priorities for humans, depending on how one de-
fines shelter.142  Humans have expressed their intense need for some type
of cover from the elements from biblical times.  In Psalm 91, the Bible
promises that, for those who live with and trust the Lord, “God will res-
cue you from the fowler’s snare, from the destroying plague, Will shelter
you with pinions, spread wings that you may take refuge . . . .”143  Modern
humans are all too cognizant of the need for shelter, as well as a reality
that is apparent in advocacy movements to end homelessness.144  The im-
138. Id.
139. See id. (requiring only that FEMA not discriminate, and not requiring any proac-
tive measures to be taken on their part to prevent discrimination).
140. See Maria Foscarinis, The Growth of a Movement for a Human Right to Housing
in the United States, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 35, 37 (2007) (recognizing the lack of guaran-
teed housing for homeless individuals).
141. W. Huitt, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, EDUC. PSYCHOL. INTERACTIVE (2007),
available at http://www.edpsycinteractive.org/topics/regsys/maslow.html (last visited July 3,
2011).  Maslow’s widely accepted theory states that humans must first secure their physio-
logical needs, such as hunger, thirst, and bodily comforts (shelter), before they can pursue
other needs. Id.
142. Id.  Maslow’s first level includes “physiological needs,” which could include shel-
ter because obtaining shelter helps one attain the physiological need to control his or her
body temperature. Id.  However, Maslow’s second level is “safety and security.” Id.  This
second level could also be interpreted to include shelter.
143. Psalms 91:1.
144. See, e.g., Michael J. Carden, Federal Council Proposes Plans to End Homeless-
ness, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (June 23, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id
=59751 (reporting on a program designed to help veterans who are homeless); ERACE
HOMELESSNESS, http://www.eracehomelessness.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2011).  Senior Sup-
port Services organizes an annual 5K and 2K walk to fund its mission to “make each day
better and safer for Denver’s homeless and hungry seniors.” SENIOR SUPPORT SERVICES,
http://www.seniorsupportservices.org/index.htm (last visited June 18, 2011).
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portance of shelter also appears in popular culture.  Mick Jagger and
Keith Richards sang about their visceral need for shelter when they
wrote: “If I don’t get some shelter, oh yeah, I’m gonna fade away.”145
Similarly, Bob Dylan wrote of his yearning for a time when a woman
“walked up to me so gracefully and took my crown of thorns. ‘Come in,’
she said, ‘I’ll give you shelter from the storm.’”146  Of course, not all peo-
ple have an absolute right to live in luxurious housing; a high-end condo-
minium in a posh neighborhood is not the minimum standard to meet
basic human needs, whereas a basic roof and four walls, even a tent—
especially in a time of crisis—could qualify as adequate and necessary
shelter.147
Despite its critical importance to human survival, the U.S. Constitution
does not recognize the right to housing.148  Government agencies do little
to help since no entitlement programs for housing exist.149  Of course,
Congress funds programs with the goal of providing better housing, but
those programs have suffered major cuts in recent decades and, even
when they were more heavily funded, have never enjoyed broad Congres-
sional support.150  To compensate for paltry funding from Congress, hous-
ing advocates have in recent years begun using a “human rights”
justification to effect change.151  The strategy has not been unique to
housing, but rather has brought change and broader public attention in
the areas of other civil and political rights.152  Congress should recognize
housing as a human right because shelter is essential to survival,153 be-
cause thousands of Americans lack proper housing,154 and because in-
145. THE ROLLING STONES, Gimme Shelter, on LET IT BLEED (London Records
1969).
146. BOB DYLAN, Shelter From the Storm, on HARD RAIN (Ram’s Horn Music 1974).
147. But see John F. Cogan, U.S. Census Bureau, Dissent to PANEL ON POVERTY AND
FAMILY ASSISTANCE 386 (1995), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/povmeas/method-
ology/nas/files/appa.pdf (disagreeing with the panel’s methodology for measuring the pov-
erty line).  While Cogan does rule out shelter as a necessity, he cautions against listing
necessities without qualifications. Id. at 387.  He asks whether there is scientific evidence
to show that “designer tennis shoes are a basic need but that the services of primary care
physicians are not.” Id. By analogy to Cogan’s question, one might ask whether an apart-
ment in a safe neighborhood with good schools is a basic need, or whether a tent in a park
would suffice. See id.
148. Maria Foscarinis, supra note 140.
149. Maria Foscarinis, Advocating for the Human Right to Housing: Notes From the
United States, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 447, 466 (2006).
150. Id. at 465.
151. Id. at 448.
152. Id.
153. Huitt, supra note 141.
154. Snapshot of Homelessness, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, http://
www.endhomelessness.org/section/about_homelessness/snapshot_of_homelessness (last
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creasingly, the United States stands alone among developed nations in
not recognizing housing as a human right.155
Congress should recognize that housing is a human right under any
circumstance, but the right is particularly acute following a natural disas-
ter.156  Recognition from Congress is important for four main reasons.
First, after a natural disaster, nearly every aspect of a victim’s life is in
utter disarray: property is lost, documents are gone, children are scat-
tered, violence sometimes results, and government aid is slow to come.157
Many of the difficulties represent human-rights violations that surface
specifically because of the natural disaster and the resulting recovery ef-
fort.158  Natural disasters highlight historical injustices against certain
groups that are “at the intersection of multiple avenues of historical injus-
tice—women and religion, for example, or minorities and housing.”159
Second, natural disasters are increasing in scale and size.160  As natural
disasters become more prevalent and more damaging to a greater popula-
tion of the country and world, responses from governmental agencies will
play a greater role in helping victims recover from the disasters.  The
third reason is a historical one. In the past, there has not been widespread
attention paid to human-rights violations following a natural disaster.161
Instead, much human-rights research has focused its attention on viola-
tions following conflicts or wars.162  Government acknowledgment of
human-rights violations will be necessary in preventing and finding solu-
tions to such violations.163
Fourth, if Congress recognizes housing as a human right, it could help
shift the framework of discussion following disasters from one of charity
to one of necessity.164  Consider the outpouring of charitable contribu-
tions following the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti.165  People around
the world gave money to help earthquake victims not because they neces-
sarily believed that housing was a human right, but they gave under the
visited June 1, 2011).  On any night in the United States, more than 643,000 people are
homeless. Id.
155. Foscarinis, supra note 140, at 47.
156. Gould, supra note 90, at 171.
157. Id. at 169.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 170.
161. Gould, supra note 90, at 170.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 173.
165. See, e.g., CLINTON BUSH HAITI FUND (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.clintonbush
haitifund.org/ (encouraging Americans to donate to the fund to help the victims of the
2010 earthquake in Haiti).
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express notion that they were acting as charitable donors.166  This mind-
set must change.  Charles W. Gould, former president and chief executive
officer of Volunteers of America, argues that thinking of housing as a
human right “empowers people to demand justice as a right, not as char-
ity, and gives communities a moral basis from which to claim interna-
tional assistance where needed.”167  Furthermore, if one thinks about the
ordeal of recovering from a natural disaster from the standpoint of
human rights, it “shifts the moral framework for action from charity to
justice . . . .”168
B. Congress Should Write Legislation More Specifically Prohibiting
and More Harshly Punishing Economic Discrimination
Following Natural Disasters
Another possible solution to the problem of economic discrimination
following natural disasters is for Congress to voice with great specificity
its prohibition on such discrimination.  To ensure effective deterrence,
Congress should not only prohibit the discrimination, as it already has in
some circumstances, but also provide strict penalties for anyone who vio-
lates the prohibition.169  For example, although the Stafford Act prohibits
such discrimination, the prohibition applies only to funds distributed
under the Stafford Act.170  However, Congress could take its condemna-
tion a step further by specifically prohibiting all discrimination based on
economic status in any situation where the victim recently endured severe
hardship as a result of a natural disaster.  Congress could withhold gov-
ernment assistance from anyone who participated in economic discrimi-
nation against a natural disaster victim, ban the discriminating party from
receiving government contracts to perform disaster aid in the future, and
provide for stiff fines and possible incarceration for those who violate the
prohibition.
Natural disasters, in some respects, are entirely nondiscriminatory,
wreaking havoc on humans of all incomes, locations, races, and nationali-
ties.  When a tragedy strikes, it can devastate a poor community just as it
can devastate a wealthy one.  However, wealthy and middle-class commu-
nities are more able to withstand and rebuild from the effects of disaster
166. See id. (raising $52 million in donations).
167. Gould, supra note 90, at 173 (quoting U.N. Secretary General, Annual Report of
the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, delivered to the General Assembly,
¶ 174, U.N. Doc. A/53/1 (Aug. 27, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report
98/ch5.htm).
168. Id.
169. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.11(a) (2010) (requiring that FEMA distribute money without
discriminating based on economic status).
170. 44 C.F.R. § 206.11(c) (2010).
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because the wealthy and the middle class have a greater cushion from
harm in the form of financial resources.
With clarification of the FEMA policy, stiffer penalties for economic
discrimination and recognition by Congress that all people have a basic
human right to housing, natural disasters will not result in double disaster
for low-income individuals.  Natural disasters cause sufficient damage on
their own, without government actions or omissions exacerbating the
problems.  With these policy modifications, the poor will suffer at the
hands of nature alone, rather than the hands of their own government.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to solve the discriminatory distribution of aid, Congress
should provide for specific penalties against those who discriminate.  To
ensure effective deterrence, Congress should not only prohibit the dis-
crimination, as it already has in some circumstances, but also provide
strict penalties for anyone who violates the prohibition.171  For example,
although the Stafford Act prohibits such discrimination, the prohibition
applies only to funds distributed under the Stafford Act.172  However,
Congress could take its prohibition a step further by specifically prohibit-
ing all discrimination based on economic status in any situation where the
victim recently endured severe hardship as a result of a natural disaster.
Those people who suffer the most after natural disasters are very often
the very same people who suffer the most in everyday life.  Low-income
people throughout the world often suffer from disasters because of the
natural surroundings of their communities and their low standard of liv-
ing before disaster strikes.173  This Comment demonstrated that victims
of natural disasters are discriminated against by the government in sev-
eral ways.
First, this Comment showed that the impermissibly vague FEMA pol-
icy is one example of how the government discriminates against low-in-
come disaster victims.  FEMA’s “insufficient damage” policy is
discriminatorily vague when analyzed according to courts’ assessments of
both agency rules and statutes.  Courts have frowned upon rules that are
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 5151(b) (2006) (conditioning “participation in the distribution of
assistance or supplies . . . or of receiving assistance under this chapter” on compliance with
nondiscrimination regulations).  The Stafford Act requires that: “the processing of applica-
tions, and other relief and assistance activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and
impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of . . . economic status.” Id.
§ 5151(a).
172. § 5151(a)–(b) (explaining rules for impartial disaster relief).
173. George Martine & Jose Miguel Guzman, Population, Poverty and Vulnerability:
Mitigating the Effects of Natural Disasters, Part 1, FOOD & ARGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (Dec. 1999), http://www.fao.org/sd/wpdirect/wpan0042.htm.
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impermissibly vague.174  Additionally, courts’ decisions regarding statu-
tory vagueness are closely analogous to the present issue because in statu-
tory analysis—as with rule analysis—the courts are considering fairness
to the public and discretionary limits of an agency.  In short, the danger in
vagueness is that parties do not have a clear sense of the rules before they
violate them.  Here, the danger is that victims of natural disasters do not
know the specifics of aid distribution when they apply for housing
assistance.175
Furthermore, if courts applied the ordinary meaning of “insufficient
damage,” they would find that FEMA’s policy does not follow the ordi-
nary meaning of the term.  Agencies must apply the ordinary meaning of
a term if that term is not defined in statute.176  Here, the ordinary mean-
ing of the term “insufficient damage” suggests that the damage is mini-
mal, or too insignificant to warrant repair.177  Admittedly, courts have
given administrative agencies broad discretion when implementing laws.
However, FEMA took discretion normally granted to agencies and
brought it to impermissible levels, as illustrated in La Union Del Pueblo
Entero v. FEMA, making its “insufficient damage” regulation so vague as
to be discriminatory.178
Second, this Comment demonstrated that FEMA’s response to Hurri-
cane Dolly was not the only instance in which the government actions
resulted in problems for low-income victims but not victims with greater
financial resources.  Because income itself is not a protected status under
the U.S. Constitution, income-based discrimination is best demonstrated
by analogy through race-based challenges.  For example, the federal gov-
ernment’s delayed response to helping the predominantly African-Amer-
ican city of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina could mean that it
violated the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution.179  Therefore,
the government has discriminated against low-income disaster victims be-
174. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 518, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(instructing the Trade Commission to develop a definitive interpretation of its procedural
rule).  An agency must provide clear interpretations of its rules so that those who rely upon
the rules have appropriate notice as to the agency’s intentions in enforcing them. Fed.
Trade Comm’n, 567 F.2d at 103.
175. 16B AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 48.
176. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994).
177. See Insufficient Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, supra note 53.
178. La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. B-08-487,
2009 WL 1346030, at *7 (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2009), vacated, 608 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 2010), cert
denied, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 525 (2010).
179. Kogut, supra note 65, 128–29.
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cause it has discriminated against minority disaster victims, and minority
disaster victims often have disproportionately low incomes.180
Perhaps such perceived discrimination is more the result of inefficient
bureaucracy rather than blatant malice or intentional discrimination on
the part of government workers.  FEMA has limited resources and must
allocate the resources Congress gives it with great care.181  Furthermore,
Congress has created a disaster-response system that makes it difficult for
agencies to cooperate in the most effective manner.
Third, despite agency actions to the contrary, Congress has specifically
ordered agencies to treat disaster victims with equity.  Such clear direc-
tion suggests that discriminatory agency actions happen in spite of, not
because of, Congressional direction on the subject.  Congress specifically
prohibited the government from discriminating based on “economic sta-
tus.”182  Furthermore, following Congress’s lead, federal agencies have
implemented their own rules that expressly forbid discrimination along
economic lines.
180. Id.
181. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 113.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2010).
